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Abstract
The aim of this study was to assess the extent to which Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC),
an individual-level epistemic motivation, can explain inter-individual variability in the cogni-
tive effort invested on a perceptual decision making task (the randommotion task). High lev-
els of NCC are manifested in a preference for clarity, order and structure and a desire for
firm and stable knowledge. The study evaluated how NCCmoderates the impact of two var-
iables known to increase the amount of cognitive effort invested on a task, namely task
ambiguity (i.e., the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination) and outcome relevance (i.e.,
the monetary gain associated with a correct discrimination). Based on previous work and
current design, we assumed that reaction times (RTs) on our motion discrimination task rep-
resent a valid index of effort investment. Task ambiguity was associated with increased cog-
nitive effort in participants with low or medium NCC but, interestingly, it did not affect the
RTs of participants with high NCC. A different pattern of association was observed for out-
come relevance; high outcome relevance increased cognitive effort in participants with
moderate or high NCC, but did not affect the performance of low NCC participants. In sum-
mary, the performance of individuals with low NCC was affected by task difficulty but not by
outcome relevance, whereas individuals with high NCC were influenced by outcome rele-
vance but not by task difficulty; only participants with medium NCC were affected by both
task difficulty and outcome relevance. These results suggest that perceptual decision mak-
ing is influenced by the interaction between context and NCC.
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Introduction
In everyday life people are continuously asked to choose between investing cognitive effort in
demanding tasks or saving resources by adopting less effortful cognitive strategies. In some
instances we make deliberate, explicit choices between two active tasks (e.g. studying for an
exam vs. watching a movie) but much more frequently choices about the level of cognitive
effort invested in a single task are made unreflectively or even unconsciously. These choices
may have implications for both the decision maker (e.g. future career) and the safety of his or
her community (e.g. air traffic control, power plant operation). In social cognition “thinking”
has been rightly conceived as “work” and people’s reluctance to invest cognitive effort has led
to the use of terms such as “cognitive miser” and “motivated tactician” [1]. Recently, individu-
als’ willingness to invest cognitive effort has been studied using adaptations of behavioral eco-
nomic paradigms in which preferences are inferred from choice behavior rather than from
self-reports [2]. In these research tasks participants are asked to choose between a low-effort
task associated with a small monetary reward and a high-effort task associated with a larger
reward; the results show that there is considerable inter-individual variability in the perceived
cost of cognitive effort [2]. This recent literature has also highlighted the importance of taking
into account individual differences in willingness to invest cognitive effort, as they may have
important implications for the prediction and explanation of everyday behavior and the design
and implementation of strategies to stimulate greater cognitive effort in educational and
employment contexts.
In this study we examined the association between Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), an
individual-level epistemic motivation that is manifested as a preference for clarity, order and
structure and a desire for firm and stable knowledge [3], and the cognitive effort invested in a
perceptual decision task. More precisely, we assessed whether NCCmoderates the impact of two
factors traditionally thought to increase cognitive effort: task difficulty and outcome relevance. In
the following paragraphs we provide a brief review of research on these variables and on NCC.
Task Difficulty, Outcome Relevance and Cognitive Effort
According to the Motivational Intensity Theory [4], [5], the intensity of cognitive effort
invested in a task depends on the perceived difficulty of the task and the reward associated with
successful performance (i.e. outcome relevance). The Motivational Intensity Theory follows
the difficulty law of motivation [6], [7], in assuming that cognitive effort normally increases as
a function of task difficulty, but stops increasing when the task is perceived as too difficult to
complete successfully (i.e. excessive task difficulty triggers disengagement). Outcome relevance,
the second most important determinant of cognitive effort according to Motivational Intensity
Theory, is defined as the importance of successful performance to the individual performer;
the more important success on a task is to a given individual, the more effort he or she is justi-
fied in expending on it. In summary, the central prediction of the Motivational Intensity The-
ory is that task difficulty and outcome relevance influence cognitive effort. Several studies have
identified psychological variables which influence both perceived task difficulty and outcome
relevance. In particular, perceived task difficulty has been linked to task demand (e.g., [8]) and
perceived fatigue (e.g., [9]), [10] whereas outcome relevance has been shown to be influenced
by the individual’s current need state (e.g., [11]), performance-contingent reward (e.g., [12]),
[13] and performance-contingent avoidance of noxious stimulation [14].
1.2. Need for Cognitive Closure and its Impact on Cognitive Processes
Need for closure has been defined as individuals’ ‘desire for a firm answer to a question, any
firm answer as compared to confusion and/or ambiguity’ ([5], p. 15) and is assumed to vary
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along a continuum ranging from strong need for closure to strong need to avoid closure. A
strong need for closure is experienced as an urgent desire for permanent closure; individuals
with a strong need for closure tend to “seize” on information which allows them to make a
judgment on a given topic and then “freeze” on that judgment, becoming relatively imperme-
able or close-minded to further relevant information [3]. Such individuals also make strong
commitments and are relatively unshakeable in their views. In contrast individuals with a
strong need to avoid closure are wary of commitments, feel more comfortable keeping their
options open and eschew binding or definite opinions. Importantly, an individual’s position on
the need for closure continuum is determined by how they perceive the relative benefits and
costs of gaining or not gaining closure, and this is determined by internal factors (dispositional
NCC) and by contextual features such as time pressure, boredom, noise and fatigue (situation-
induced NCC, for a review see [15]).
It is worth pointing out that NCC is not, as Cacioppo and Petty [16] proposed, simply the
opposite of need for cognition. Need for cognition is defined as the amount of effortful cogni-
tive activity that an individual seeks and enjoys [16]. Individuals with high need for cognition
process information in a more elaborate and effortful manner [17]. As Webster and Kruglanski
[18] made clear, need for cognition influences the quantity of cognitive activity one engages in,
thus determining the effort an individual will invest in a task, whereas need for closure relates
to the motivation underlying cognitive effort. This means that need for cognition, and conse-
quently cognitive effort are reduced by NCC.
As a consequence, the relation between the need for cognition and the need for cognitive
closure is not straightforward (see [18]). Indeed, while people reporting high need for cognition
process information in more effortful and elaborative way [17], the need for cognitive closure
is defined by the will to reach a definite answers as soon as possible.
Kruglanski and colleagues [19] recently proposed a Cognitive Energetic Theory (CET)
which uses field-force analysis to provide insight into the mechanisms underlying selection of
cognitive effort level for a task. CET, which builds on previous theories such Motivation Inten-
sity Theory [4], [5] and the Lay Epistemic Theory [20], posits that at the moment of choice
there are forces driving cognitive effort (e.g. goal importance and resource availability), and
forces restraining cognitive effort (e.g. task demand and personal tendency to conserve cogni-
tive resources, i.e. NCC). Unlike Motivation Intensity Theory [4], [5], which focuses on objec-
tive modulators of effort, the Lay Epistemic Theory [20] focuses on individual factors and CET
integrates these two theories by considering both factors together.
Overall both the NCC literature and the new CET predict that high NCC individuals will be
less motivated to invest cognitive effort in a task than low NCC individuals. This prediction
has been confirmed by recent research on the neural mechanisms underlying NCC [21], [22].
In particular, Viola et al. [21] recently showed that relatively high NCC is associated with
reduced online adjustment in cognitive control, as indexed by adaptation to behavioral conflict.
This behavioral effect appeared to be mediated by dynamic changes in cortico-cortical func-
tional connectivity between prefrontal regions involved in conflict monitoring and implemen-
tation of cognitive control. Specifically, after exposure to conflict functional connectivity
appeared to be increased in low NCC but not high NCC individuals [21]. Moreover, in a recent
study using event-related potentials Kossowska and colleagues [22] showed that NCC reflected
basic differences in conflict monitoring, demonstrating that greater NCC predicted lower levels
of conflict-related activity. Both these studies support the hypothesis that there is a negative
relationship between NCC and cognitive effort.
Drawing on this recent literature, the objectives of this study were to confirm the negative
correlation between NCC and cognitive effort and to assess whether NCC moderates the influ-
ence of task difficulty and outcome relevance on cognitive effort [4],[5].
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To our knowledge only one previous study has investigated the interaction between NCC,
task difficulty and cognitive effort [23] and the results showed that task difficulty only
increased cognitive effort in conditions of situationally-induced low NCC (but not in condi-
tions of situationally-induced high NCC).
This study was intended to extend the results of the earlier research in two ways. Firstly, we
intended to assess whether the effects obtained by Roets and colleagues [23] using a situational
manipulation of NCC could be replicated with respect to dispositional NCC.
More in particular, we tested for possible interactions between dispositional and situational
factors, where dispositional factors are defined as personal and individual tendencies that
applies generally across different situations in contrast to manipulations of external conditions
that affect the individual behavior (situational factors)
Here we address this question by having subjects with different dispositional NCC levels (as
indicated by scores on the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale [24]) perform a motion discrimi-
nation task in which situational factors were manipulated through a modulation of task diffi-
culty obtained by varying the ambiguity level of the motion stimuli.
Secondly, we wanted to assess whether dispositional NCC moderated the influence of out-
come relevance—operationalized as the monetary gain associated with correct performance—
as well as moderating the impact of task difficulty. We followed an earlier study [23] in index-
ing cognitive effort using reaction time (RT) measures, based on the assumption that higher
RTs during our motion discrimination task represent a valid index of effort investment
intended as a willingness to spend time viewing the motion display.
Following theories, which posit that low NCC individuals have intrinsic motivations to
invest cognitive effort [25], [26], we predicted that changes in task difficulty (operationalized as
stimulus ambiguity) would bring low NCC participants to spend more time before making a
decision. Conversely, we hypothesized that increasing outcome relevance (operationalized as
the monetary reward for a correct discrimination) would increase RTs in high but not low
NCC participants. This hypothesis was based on the assumptions that high NCC individuals
perceive cognitive effort as less useful than low NCC individuals and are as sensitive to mone-
tary rewards as individuals whose mental resources are exhausted [27], [28]. The cognitive
effort can be defined as the mental effort spent by an individual on a process [29] and on this
basis there are many ways in which cognitive effort can be operazionalized in addition or in
alternative to RTs on a task. For example, larger gaze time have been taken to be a direct reflec-
tion of cognitive effort [30], [31] but if it is requested a response selection between two compet-
itive options also RTs are expected to be longer in condition of high cognitive effort demand
(e.g. [29]). In another series of studies by Roets et al. [23] in which participants with low and
high levels of NFC (dispositional or situational/manipulated) performed a cognitive task with
different levels of difficulty. In these studies the cognitive effort was measured as participants’
information-gathering behavior and by self-report measures of the perceived effort investment.
The results showed a positive correlation between invested effort and cognitive closure only for
individuals with low NFC scores. These results foster the expectations that the NFC influences
the effort that people are prepared to invest.
Method
2.1. Subjects
Three hundred and seventy-three volunteers (18-36 years old) completed a questionnaire
about decisional styles and the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NCCS; [24]). The sample was
divided into three sub-groups based on NCC score (high NCC: 4th quartile, medium NCC:
2nd and 3rd quartile, low NCC: 1st quartile) and we recruited participants with scores as near
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as possible to the median of each sub-group. Twenty-one subjects with low NCC (mean
NCC = 34.71, SD = 3.50), 20 subjects with medium NCC (mean NCC = 42.27 SD = 2.78), and
19 subjects with high NCC (mean NCC = 53.94, SD = 5.49) agreed to participate in the behav-
ioral experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written
informed consent to participation. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Santa Lucia Foundation (Scientific Institute for Research Hospitalization and Health Care).
The participants were fully debriefed about the aims of the study after the experiments.
2.2. Random Dot Motion (RDM) Stimuli and Task
The random dot motion (RDM) task [32–45] is a classical perceptual decision making task.
The stimuli are clouds of dots presented on a computer screen; a certain percentage of dots in a
cloud move in a specific direction (the target direction) whilst the remainder move randomly.
Participants are required to indicate the apparent direction of the dot cloud; the percentage of
dots moving in the target direction is typically used as a measure of task difficulty (see e.g.
[34]). In order to respond correctly, an observer should count the number of dots moving in
each direction; however the motion-sensitive neurons in the brain respond to their preferred
motion direction and to similar directions, so the perceptual system introduces variance to the
perceived motion and decisions are typically made on the basis of overall perceptual
impression.
Stimuli were generated using in-house software, implemented in MATLAB (The Math-
Works Inc., Natick, MA; USA) [46] using Cogent 2000 [47] (developed at FIL and ICN, UCL,
London, UK) and Cogent Graphics (developed by John Romaya at LON, Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK). The motion stimulus was a random-dot
kinetogram [34] contained within a circular aperture with 0.75° diameter centered on a fixation
point. The dots were white squares subtending 0.15° and were displayed against a black back-
ground. The dots were plotted in three interleaved sets of equal size. Each set was plotted in
one of three successive video frames (frame rate = 75Hz) and shown for one frame. Three
frames (40ms) later a proportion of the dots from the set was plotted at a displacement of 0.2°
to give the impression of coherent motion and the remaining dots were re-plotted at random
locations. Together, the three sets produced a dot density of 50° per second. A fixation cross
appeared at the centre of the display throughout each trial.
2.3. Psychophysical Calibration Session
Before the main experiment we used the RDM direction discrimination task to determine two
motion coherence levels for each subject, one associated with chance discrimination levels
(high ambiguity; difficult decision) and one associated with a 75% probability of selecting a
given (left or right) direction of motion (low ambiguity; easy decision) (Fig 1). Eleven motion
coherence levels (percentage of stimuli moving consistently in a given direction: 0% and 10%,
25%, 50%, 60%, 75% for both leftwards and rightward motion) were presented in this calibra-
tion session; all the levels were presented 12 times and levels were randomly interleaved from
trial to trial. The RDM stimuli were 132 dot clouds depicted in green and were presented for a
random interval (range: 100-1500ms). Each trial started with a 1000ms presentation of a static
cloud; this was followed by a 5000ms presentation of a moving cloud.
Calibration data were subjected to a probit analysis of binomial responses based on maxi-
mum likelihood estimation [48], [49]; this allowed us to determine the threshold and slope of a
psychometric function describing the probability of choosing a given motion direction as a
function of motion coherence for individual subjects. Interpolation of this psychometric func-
tion was used to select the motion coherence level which would yield a given directional
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response 50% or 75% of the time on average (Fig 1). The 50% level (point of subjective equality;
PSE) was used as the high ambiguity condition and the 25% and 75% levels were used as low
ambiguity condition for the two directions. Five subjects were excluded after the calibration
phase because their psychophysical curves were a bad fit to the psychometric function (r2<
.50).
It is important to note that using individually calibrated motion coherence levels provided a
degree of control for inter-subject variability in motion perception and motion classification
without affecting potential RT variability in response to task manipulations.
2.4. Main Experiment
The main task consisted of 72 experimental trials: 48 low ambiguity trials (24 for each motion
direction) and 24 high ambiguity trials. The coherence levels for the low and high ambiguity
trials were individually selected during the calibration phase as described above.
In half the trials the dots in the RDM stimulus were depicted in green and in the other half
they were depicted in red. Volunteers were told that the color indicated the reward available
for correct performance. When the dot cloud was green there were no points at stake (low out-
come relevance), whereas when the dot cloud was red they could win or lose 30 points depend-
ing on their performance (high outcome relevance). This resulted in a 2 by 2 factorial design,
with task ambiguity and outcome relevance as the main within-subjects factors (Fig 2).
Fig 1. Psychophysical calibration session. The graphs illustrate the selection of motion coherence levels yielding a rightwards response in 25% (low
ambiguity), 50% (high ambiguity) and 75% (low ambiguity) of cases. The solid curve represents the best-fitting psychometric function for a representative
subject, and describes the probability of a rightwards response as a function of the motion coherence of the RDM stimulus. The scatter plot shows the raw
data from which the estimate was computed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146002.g001
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A 1000 ms presentation of a colored static cloud was used at the start of each trial to inform
the subject of the outcome relevance of that trial. In the following 5000 ms the dots moved
along the designated trajectory at the designated coherence level. During this phase subjects
were required to indicate the overall direction of dots by pressing either the left or the right
key.
Subjects were told that only the participant with the highest final score would have get a
financial bonus of €10 but at the end of the experiment all participants were compensated with
€10 and debriefed about the purpose of the experiment.
2.5. Statistical Analyses
Two one-way ANOVAs with NCC group (low; medium; high) as between-subjects factor and
motion coherence level as a dependent variables were used to confirm that there were no group
differences in motion coherence levels.
Fig 2. Task ambiguity and outcome relevance. Schematic representation of the two independent variables manipulated during the decision task: outcome
relevance and task ambiguity. Low outcome relevance trials (no points at stake) were indicated by green dots; high outcome relevance trials (30 points at
stake) were indicated by red dots.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146002.g002
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Next we assessed the linear relationship between accuracy and RT (i.e. the speed-accuracy
trade-off effect [50]) by linear correlation analysis of mean accuracy and RT data (averaged
across task ambiguity and outcome relevance factors) for the sample as a whole.
Finally we investigated the hypothesized moderation of the associations between cognitive
effort and task ambiguity and outcome relevance by NCC, using a mixed ANOVA with NCC
group (low; medium; high) as between-subjects factor and outcome relevance (low; high) and
task ambiguity (low; high) as within-subjects factors and RT as the dependent variable.
Results
3.1. Psychophysical Calibration
The two one-way ANOVAs on the selected motion coherence levels in the three NCC groups
showed no significant group differences (50% level: F(1,52) = .352; p = .705; 25–75% levels: F
(1,52) = .985; p = .382)
Analysis of the correlations between RT and accuracy indicated that there was no relation-
ship between speed and accuracy, indicating that subjects’ RTs were a good index of the effort
invested in the task and were unrelated to the accuracy of their performance (low outcome rele-
vance + low task ambiguity: r = .027; p = .846; high outcome relevance + low task ambiguity: r
= -.112; p = .420; low outcome relevance + high task ambiguity: r = .010; p = .940; high outcome
relevance + high task ambiguity: r = .156; p = .259).
3.2. Main Experiment
A 3 (NCC: low; medium; high) x 2 (outcome relevance: low; high) x 2 (task ambiguity: low;
high) ANOVA revealed main effects of NCC (F(1,52) = 4.360; p = .018), outcome relevance (F
(1,52) = 7.682; p = .008; partial η2 = 1.141), and task ambiguity (F(1,52) = 31.412; p = .001; par-
tial η2 = .376). Interestingly there were also interactions between NCC and outcome relevance
(F(1,52) = 3.266; p = .046; partial η2 = .120) and between NCC and task ambiguity (F(1,52) =
3.671; p = .032; partial η2 = .116). The interaction between outcome relevance and task ambigu-
ity was instead not significant (F(1,52) = 0.712; p = .495; partial η2 = .024) and there was also a
lack of NCC x task ambiguity x outcome relevance interaction (F(1,52) = 0.712; p = .495; partial
η2 = .026).
The existence of a main effect of NCC confirmed the prediction that participants with low
NCC would invest more cognitive effort in the perceptual task. Post-hoc comparisons of RTs
in the three NCC groups indicated that mean RTs were higher in the low NCC group than the
medium or high NCC groups (p< .05). The efficacy of the two experimental manipulations
was confirmed by the effects of outcome relevance and task ambiguity on RTs. The three main
effects were, however, qualified by two interactions, between NCC and outcome relevance (Fig
3) and between NCC and task ambiguity (Fig 4). Newmann-Keuls post-hoc analysis confirmed
that high outcome relevance only increased RTs in medium and high NCC participants (low
vs. high outcome relevance, medium NCC: p = .001; high NCC: p = 0.005; low NCC: p = .702).
Task ambiguity showed the opposite pattern of association with post-hoc analyses confirming
that high task ambiguity only increased RTs in low and medium NCC participants (low vs.
high ambiguity, low NCC: p = .004; medium NCC: p = .001; high NCC: p = .400).
Discussion
This study provides new insight into the factors which influence the level of cognitive effort
invested in a task by demonstrating that their influence can be moderated by individual differ-
ences in NCC. In particular, we showed that the effect of changes in task difficulty varies
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according to dispositional NCC: low NCC individuals increased their cognitive effort when the
discrimination was more difficult but high NCC individuals did not. Task ambiguity alone is
not sufficient to prompt high NCC individuals to increase their cognitive effort.
A different pattern of results was seen when outcome relevance effects were analyzed. High
NCC individuals invested more cognitive effort when correct performance resulted in mone-
tary gain whereas outcome relevance did not affect the performance of low NCC individuals.
This pattern of results is reminiscent of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion (e.g. Self-Determination Theory, [25]) and suggests that low NCC subjects—assumed to
be intrinsically motivated to determine the direction of the dot cloud—invested more cognitive
effort to cope with the increase in task ambiguity whereas high NCC subjects—assumed to be
extrinsically motivated—invested more cognitive effort only when correct performance was
financially remunerative. This confirms and extends the Webster and Kruglanski [18]’s
hypothesis of a negative association between need for cognition and need for closure as we
found that only certain factors (in this experiment, availability of financial reward) were effec-
tive in increasing cognitive effort in individuals with high NCC. We conclude from these
results that although people with high NCC generally exert less cognitive effort on a task, spe-
cific contexts lead them to increase their cognitive effort. The moderating effect of NCC on the
relationships between cognitive effort and task ambiguity and outcome relevance which was
observed in this study is consistent with previous research by Roets and colleagues [23] on the
effects of situation-induced changes in NCC, and with complementary research by Westbrook
and colleagues [2] on trait need for cognition [51], which has been shown to be moderately
negatively associated with NCC [18].
In addition, the evidence that high NCC subjects invested more cognitive effort in condi-
tions of high outcome relevance suggests that participants with high NCC levels are more moti-
vated by the outcome. More specific investigation of cognitive effort using a design which
manipulates exhaustion of cognitive resources in groups varying in dispositional NCC would
be required to understand these relationships in detail.
A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study [21] provided evidence on
the neural correlates of NCC showing that high NCC was associated with reduced online
adjustment in cognitive control, as indexed by adaptation to behavioral conflict. The same
study showed that the difference in cognitive adaptation between high and low NCC partici-
pants was mediated by differences in the level of functional integration between two regions of
the frontal cortex (the inferior frontal gyrus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) which are
Fig 3. Interaction between NCC and outcome relevance. The graph shows mean RTs as a function of
NCC and outcome relevance (low; high). The asterisks highlight the significant increases in cognitive effort
(RTs) which occurred in trials with high outcome relevance in medium and high NCC subjects but not low
NCC subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0146002.g003
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critically involved in top-down inhibitory control [52]. It is interesting to note that the same
regions have also been associated with reduced self-control in the context of cognitive depletion
[29].
Finally, it is worth noting that both manipulations affected the performance of the medium
NCC group. We speculate that manipulations’ effects on medium NCC depend totally on the
context, i.e. individuals with a medium NCCmay invest more cognitive effort when confronted
with highly ambiguous tasks and when task performance is associated with a monetary gain
(outcome relevance).
These results have implications for theory development and for applications. Firstly they
suggest that general rules describing how external, objective variables, such as stimulus ambi-
guity and outcome relevance, influence effort should be refined to take into account interac-
tions with individual-level psychological factors such as NCC. Secondly, future research could
explore whether NCC interacts with other variables that have been shown to affect the level of
cognitive effort invested in a task, such as reward appraisal processes (see e.g. [53]). Uncon-
scious reward cues increase cognitive effort without affecting the speed-accuracy trade-off or
self-focus [54]. Thirdly, it would be interesting to assess inter-individual variability in NCC in
children and to investigate whether NCC is involved in learning disabilities.
These result also have implications for work in contexts or on tasks that require intense or
prolonged cognitive effort, for example they suggest that in these circumstances employers
could maximize performance by selecting low NCC individuals to perform the tasks or by pro-
viding high NCC employees with an appropriate financial incentive.
Individual differences in motivation to invest cognitive effort should also be considered
when making diagnostic assessments of neurocognitive abilities in order to avoid confusing
low motivation with limited capability. In further investigations it would be interesting to use a
combination of indices of cognitive effort (e.g. indices based on self-reported stress) or to
administer this decision making task to a sample with a wider age range i.e. to evaluate poten-
tial age differences in response to manipulations of variables such as task ambiguity and out-
come relevance.
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